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ANN Based Sensor and Actuator Fault Detection in Nuclear Reactors 
Abstract— In the nuclear power plants (NPPs), fault detection 
and diagnosis (FDD) methods are very important to improve the 
safety and reliability of plants. Researchers have established 
various FDD methods such as, model-based methods, data-driven 
methods, and signal-based methods. In practical applications 
model-based methods are very difficult to achieve. Thus, various 
data-driven methods and signal-based methods have been applied 
for monitoring key subsystems in NPPs. In this paper a brief 
overview of Artificial Neural Network (ANN) based FDD method 
is presented. Simulated data have been generated to train the 
ANNs as per requirement and to compare with the plant signal 
during fault. A technique has been proposed analyzing two sensors 
data (power sensor and coolant sensor) to determine the sensor 
and actuator fault in closed loop in presence of robust 
(Proportional-Integral-Derivative) PID controller. Results are 
produced with credible MATLAB simulation.  
 
Index Terms— ANN, Fault Detection, NPP, PWR 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is a highly complex process 
plant where a number of sensors and actuators are used to 
monitor and control different parameters, respectively. 
However, sensors and actuators endure various faults such as 
component failure and variations in operating conditions over 
time due to their inner structural modifications which leads to 
precision degradation of measurement and efficiency of plants. 
Therefore, reliable functioning of sensors and actuators is 
crucial for optimal process control. To maintain high level of 
performance of NPPs, it is necessary to detect and diagnose 
faults promptly so that corrective action can be taken to 
accommodate the system alternation to prevent the certain 
shutdown or any big accidental scenario [1].  
Over the past decades, researchers have devoted them to 
fault detection and isolation modelling. Many methods for faults 
detection and isolation have already been established. Model 
based fault detection is extremely popular among those methods. 
Raphaela et al. in [2] proposed a fault detection method based 
on physical redundancy where the output is compared with that 
of the redundant sensor. Gautam et al. in [3] has shown a 
statistical algorithm for time-varying incipient fault detection 
and isolation of sensors. Extended Kalman filter has been used 
here to formulate the fault detection index and fault signature. 
Another technique proposed by Zhao et al. in [4] is based on 
an integrated approach to detect and isolate the fault of the field 
devices like sensors, actuators, controllers in NPPs. With this 
procedure, nuclear plants are described as a causal graph where 
individual process variable is in connection with adaptive fuzzy 
inference system models. Support vector machine and improved 
particle swarm optimization (PSO) have been applied for hybrid 
fault diagnosis in [5]. Ma et al. [6] has published a review on 
applications of fault detection and diagnosis methods on NPPs. 
Effectiveness of fault tolerant techniques in digital instruments 
was studied in [7]. Chao et al. [8] has combined deep neural 
networks with system performance models for hybrid deep fault 
detection and isolation. An improved Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) method for detecting and isolating sensor faults 
in a NPP has been proposed in [9]. Mandal et al. [10] has 
proposed a statistical method for fault detection and isolation 
where an enhanced reconstruction method is presented using 
Enhanced Singular Value Decomposition (ESVD) for a Fast 
Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR). 
ANN is capable of solving nonlinear problems and hence it 
can be used effectively in fault detection and classification [11]. 
ANN is widely accepted and it has following features:  
1) ANN can predict fast, reliably, and accuratly depending 
on the training, because its working depends upon a series of 
very simple operations. 
2) The nature of the nuclear reactor system changes with 
disturbances. Hence a neural network can incorporate the 
dynamic changes in the reactor systems.  
Artificial Neural network (ANN) based fault detection 
technique for nuclear reactors has been proposed by Hwang et 
al. [11] and Elnokity et al. [12]. However, this technique deals 
mainly with sensor faults. 
In this paper, a fault detection technique of power sensors, 
coolant temperature sensors and actuators (control rod) has 
been established by analyzing only two sensor data in closed 
loop in presence of a robust PID controller. The fault detection 
problem becomes more challenging due to the robust PID 
controller, which can reject disturbances and has good tracking 
capability.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
II describes a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) type of NPPs. 
In Section III, details of ANN, data generation, training and 
detection technique are established. Section IV presents the 
credible MATLAB simulation for three cases: power sensor 
fault, coolant temperature sensor fault and actuator fault. 
Finally, Section IV concludes this work. 
II. PWR WITH THERMAL HYDRAULIC MODEL  
In this section, it is attempted to obtain an interval state space 
model for a PWR. A normalized point kinetic model of a PWR 
has been considered with a thermal hydraulic model. The 
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Xenon and Iodine dynamics are of less consequence during 
total power control, so they are not considered here.  

































where P is neutronic power, t   is total reactivity,    is 
neutron generation time, i  , i  , and iC   are decay constant, 
fraction of delayed neutrons, and delayed neutron precursors’ 
concentration of 
thi   group, respectively. 
The core thermal-hydraulics model is given by Mann’s 
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(5) 
where fT   is average fuel temperature; 1cT   and 2cT  are average 
coolant temperatures in node 1 and node 2, respectively; cinT  is 
inlet temperatures of the first coolant node; fH  characterizes 
the rate of rise of fuel temperatures; f   and c  are time 
constants representing mean time for heat transfer from fuel to 
coolant and from core outlet to inlet, respectively while r   
represents coolant residence time in the core. The heat transfer 
coefficient from fuel to coolant is assumed to be constant. 
In this paper only the power control loop without secondary 
side coolant heat transfer has been considered. The change in 
total reactivity is considered due to the control rod movement 
and reactivity feedback due to fuel and coolant temperature. 
Here, a control rod acts as an actuator and this actuator 





=  (6) 
where ex  is the external reactivity injected to the reactor core 
due to the control rod movement, G is the reactivity worth of 
control rod while z  is the speed of the control rod movement. 
The total reactivity can be obtained by: 
1 2t ex f f c c c cT T T    = + + +  (7) 
where, f  and c  represent the temperature coefficients of 
reactivity due to fuel and coolant, respectively. Then (1)-(7) 
have been used to develop a nonlinear model of PWR. In this 
case itis assumed that, the input variable is controlling rod speed 
and the output variables are reactor power and coolant average 
temperature. In this paper, avoiding the detailed design of the 
sensor, sensor gain has been incorporated to the system, which 
is assumed to be linear for corresponding output. Next section 
will describe the procedure of the fault detection modeling. 
III. FAULT DETECTION MODELLING  
ANN has powerful non-linear mapping properties, noise 
tolerance, self-learning and parallel processing capabilities 
which add an important feature of a neural network used for 
prediction or estimation. It will also learn the dynamics of the 
system either to be linear or non-linear dynamic behaviour 
during the learning session made over several learning cycles. 
a. Structure of ANN 
In this case, two networks are required as shown in table1 
and every network is built with two-layer feed-forward 
networks with sigmoid hidden neurons and linear output 
neurons. For the given consistent data and enough neurons in 




Fig.1 Structure of Neural Network (NN) 
Fig. 1 describes the structure of the each NN. The number of 
neurons in hidden layer for each network is different and it has 
been chosen by several runs of trial and error procedure and the 
best result has been taken for training. Table 1 shows the details 
of the network. 
b. Data generation and training: 
For ANN based fault detection, fault free input and output data 
are required for training purpose of ANN. The training data sets 
have been generated from the system simulation model 
described in section II, rather than actual operational plant data. 
 
TABLE I. DIFFERENT NETWORK STRUCTURE 
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Temperature 
(Y2) 
Fig.2. Random input signal 
 
Fig 2 depicts the random different combinations of demand 
power which is used as an input data for the reactor system. 
Here, the power change has been considered within the range 
of 60% Full Power (FP) – 100%FP for 5000 seconds with 
different pattern and magnitude between above range as shown 
in Fig.2. Next, the reactor model has been simulated without 
any fault with this random demand power described above. In 
this case, it has also been considered that a robust PID controller 
as described in [14] is working with the reactor model. The 
reactor output power (Y1) and the coolant temperature (Y2), 
corresponding to this input signal (X1), have been generated 
and stored in MATLAB workspace. 
The networks are trained to adjust the weights to minimize 
the performance function. The gradient of the performance is 
determined using Levenberg–Marquardt (LM) back 
propagation technique which involves performing 
computations backward through the network. Mean Square 
Error (MSE) and Regression analysis (R) are used to test the 
performance. The average squared difference between outputs 
and targets is called MSE, lower values are better and zero 
means no error. The correlation between outputs and targets is 
measured by R values. R value= 1 means a close relationship 
while the same of 0 indicates a random relationship. The LM 
algorithm is the most used for adjustment of the parameters of 
the Multi-Layer Perceptron neural networks.  
 
 
Fig.3. Regression analysis of NN1. 
 
Fig.4. Performance analysis of NN1 using MSE. 
 
The training response curves of two networks are shown in 
Fig.3–Fig.6. ANN training response for NN1 has been shown 
in Fig.3 and Fig.4 while Fig.5 and Fig.6 are for the NN2. Fig.3 
and Fig.5 having four subplots represent the regression analysis 
during training at one epoch interval. Fig.4 and Fig.6 show the 
corresponding training performance. Those graphs depict that 
all networks have optimal successful results of training. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Regression analysis of NN2. 
 
Actual power sensor output and NN1 output have been 
compared and generated a percentage error ( 1e ). Similarly, 
actual coolant sensor output has been compared with NN2 and 
generated a % error ( 2e ). The comparisons of NN1 and NN2 
with the corresponding actual outputs are shown in Fig.7 and 
Fig.8 respectively. 
c. Failure and detection technique 
In this work the sensor output of coolant temperature is not 
feedback to the reactor and only output from power sensor is 
considered for the feedback. Thus, during fault in the 
temperature sensor there is no variation in 1e . Only 2e  will 




Fig.7. Network prediction with actual output with different data set of 
NN1 
 
Fig.8. Network prediction with actual output with different data set of 
NN2 
 
have a change in magnitude. But in case of power sensor failure, 
both 1e  and 2e  show a significant change. However, a PID 
controller in the closed loop will try to minimise 1e . As a result, 
in 1e  a sharp peak will appear while 2e  has a persistent value. 
In case of actuator saturation fault, the complete tracking is not 
possible so 1e  and 2e  both have a significant persistent value. 
1e  and 2e for all three faults have been shown in detail in 
Section IV in Fig.12-13, Fig.16-17 and Fig.20-21 respectively. 
This technique has been depicted in Fig.9 and used for the fault 
detection. 
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS  
The trained ANNs based fault detection technique described 
in Section III is used to determine the faults in this section. In 
this paper three fault cases have been carried out. 
  
a. Case1: Fault in temperature sensor 
First it is assumed that the reactor is running at 100%FP. After 
60sec demand power is reduced to 80%FP at 10%FP/min ramp. 
The controller for power loop is working well to handle this 
power manoeuvring. Then at 200 sec a random fault in 
temperature sensor bias within limit 10%  has been injected. 
Actual output power and coolant temperature has been shown 
in Fig.10 and Fig.11. Fig.12 and Fig.13 depict the error 1e  and 
2e  respectively. 
 
 
Fig.9. Flowchart for fault detection technique 
 
 
Fig.10. Actual normalized reactor power during fault in coolant temperature 
sensor. 
 
As only reactor power is acting as a feedback element, so 
during fault in temperature sensor 2e  is not affecting the 
reactor power. So 1e will remain in its tolerant limit, whereas 
2e  
has a persistent value as shown in Fig.12 and Fig.13. 
From Fig.9 it can be referred as a fault in temperature sensor.  
 
 
Fig.11. Actual coolant temperature during fault in coolant temperature 
sensor. 
 
Fig.12. 1e  during fault in coolant temperature sensor. 
 
Fig.13. 2e during fault in coolant temperature sensor. 
b. Case2: Fault in power sensor 
In this case, the initial condition of the reactor and the 
reduction of demand power scenario have been considered and 
are same with earlier ones. At 210 sec a random bias fault 
having limit 5%  has been injected. Corresponding actual 
reactor power, coolant temperature, 1e  and 2e  have been 
depicted in Fig.14-Fig.17 respectively. 
 
Fig.14. Actual normalised reactor power during fault in power sensor 
 
Fig.15. Actual coolant temperature during fault in power sensor 
 
Fig.16. 1e  during fault in power sensor 
As described in earlier section, output from power sensor is 
attached as a feedback connection. During a fault in power 
sensor, controller will try to track the reference signal which 
minimizes the process fault and 1e  as well. So, a peak will 
appear in 1e  as shown in Fig.14. Again, this peak may appear 




Fig.17. 2e  during fault in power sensor 
To avoid this confusion, 2e  also is observed. If there is a fault 
in power sensor, the controller will try to minimise the error by 
introducing more positive or negative reactivity depending 
upon the direction of the fault which will ultimately affect the 
coolant temperature. Thus, there always a non-zero steady 
deviation will appear in 2e  as depicted in Fig.17. Owing to this 
situation it can be referred as a fault in power sensor. 
c. Case3: Fault in actuator (control rod) 
In this case, again it assumed that the reactor is running at 
100% FP and change in demand power is considered as earlier. 
During this transient it is assumed that control rod has been 
stuck in 90% of its actual position. Fig.18-Fig.21 depict the 
respective actual reactor power, coolant temperature, 1e and 2e
respectively. 
 
Fig.18. Actual normalized reactor power during fault in actuator. 
In this case the actual reactor power could not reach to 
80%FP due to actuator saturation which will also affect the 
coolant temperature. Thus, in this case 1e and 2e  both will 
have a significant persistent value as shown in Fig.20 and 
Fig.21. which only happens due to actuator fault. 
 
 
Fig.19. Actual coolant temperature during fault in actuator. 
 
 
Fig.20. 1e  during fault in power actuator. 
 
Fig.21. 2e  during fault in actuator. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
In this work, fault detection in sensors and actuators of a 
PWR based NPP has been established only using the power 
sensor data and coolant sensor data. Well performing ANNs 
have been created for power sensors and coolant sensors. Three 
faults and their detection technique have been shown with a 
credible simulation. However, this methodology is tested with 
sensor bias fault only. As the sensor drift is a slow process it is 
a challenging task to apply this technique for detection of sensor 
drift. Further work can be carried out in that direction and 
isolation process. 
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